[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":7},["ShallowReactive",2],{"docs-changelog\u002F2026-09-06":3,"docs-tabs-changelog\u002F2026-09-06":6},{"content":4,"lastmod":5},"# API changes: September 6, 2026\n\n[← Changelog](\u002Fdocs\u002Fchangelog) · [September 2026](\u002Fdocs\u002Fchangelog\u002F2026-09)\n\n### FIX-0906-1: a free Bitrix24 plan now answers key issuance terminally, not with a \"retry later\"\n\n**Before**\n\nA cloud account on a free Bitrix24 plan could get 502 `CONNECTOR_REST_UNAVAILABLE` with\n`details.retryable: true` on key issuance, whenever its Marketplace access read as in\nforce. The answer promised that a retry would help. Bitrix24 shuts REST off entirely on\na free plan, so a retry never did.\n\nThe `activation.marketTrial.available` flag in `GET \u002Fv1\u002Fcowork\u002Fstate` has always read\n`false` on this segment: the Marketplace trial is a subscription-region product, so\n`POST \u002Fv1\u002Fcowork\u002Factivate-market-trial` never had a one-time trial to spend here.\n\n**After**\n\nThe same case answers terminally with the refusal this segment already uses for a plan\nthat does not carry access — `INT_TARIFF_REQUIRED` (403) with a `userMessage` naming the\nremedy, a paid Bitrix24 plan. The code is not new; what changed is the set of states it\ncomes in: previously only \"access paid for but not in force\", now any access state on a\nplan read as free. A retry without changing the plan returns the same thing.\n\n`activation.marketTrial.available` keeps its `region_not_supported` reason on this\nsegment, and `POST \u002Fv1\u002Fcowork\u002Factivate-market-trial` together with\n`POST \u002Fv1\u002Fportals\u002F{id}\u002Factivate-market-trial` keep refusing exactly as before — that\nhalf of the change is region-gated above the plan check and does not reach here. An\naccount on the Bitrix24 demo plan is not affected either: that plan does not shut REST\noff, so it keeps the answer it had. An account whose plan could not be read behaves as\nbefore.\n\n### BC-0906-2: PATCH \u002Fv1\u002Finfra\u002Fservers\u002F:id\u002Fmode rejects opening a server with a sealed role\n\n> Old format supported until: not provided\n\n**Before**\n\nFor a server whose role (a pool member, a service machine) requires a sealed network policy, [PATCH \u002Fv1\u002Finfra\u002Fservers\u002F:id\u002Fmode](\u002Fdocs\u002Finfra\u002Faccess\u002Fmode) with `mode: \"OPEN\"` responded `200`: the server did switch to open mode, and the issued SSH password worked.\n\n**After**\n\nSuch a request is now rejected with `409 MODE_SWITCH_SEALED_ROLE`; the server's mode is left unchanged and no password is issued. The rejection applies where the server's network policy is backed by the additional layer for that server; where it is not backed, behavior is unchanged.\n\n**What integrators should do**\n\nClients that expected `200` for servers with a sealed role must handle `409 MODE_SWITCH_SEALED_ROLE` as a terminal rejection: open mode is not available for such a server, and retrying will not help. For other servers (not a sealed role), `200` and password issuance are unchanged.\n\n### NEW-0906-3: PATCH \u002Fv1\u002Finfra\u002Fservers\u002F:id\u002Fmode may return a network-policy switch failure\n\n[PATCH \u002Fv1\u002Finfra\u002Fservers\u002F:id\u002Fmode](\u002Fdocs\u002Finfra\u002Faccess\u002Fmode) enforces a server's network policy with one more layer — outside the guest machine, on top of the protection already in place inside it. If switching the server's network policy fails, the endpoint responds `503 SECURITY_GROUP_ATTACH_FAILED`; the server's mode is left unchanged, and retrying the request makes sense. This rejection is only possible where the additional layer is supported for a given server; where it is not supported, the endpoint's behavior is unchanged.\n\n### FIX-0906-4: PATCH \u002Fv1\u002Finfra\u002Fservers\u002F:id\u002Fmode closes the server firewall when the connection drops mid-switch\n\n**Before**\n\n[PATCH \u002Fv1\u002Finfra\u002Fservers\u002F:id\u002Fmode](\u002Fdocs\u002Finfra\u002Faccess\u002Fmode) performs the switch by running commands on the server itself. If the connection was lost partway through that sequence — a timeout, a dropped tunnel, an unreachable agent — the endpoint returned an error, but the server could be left with its firewall already open while its mode stayed `BLACKHOLE`: the opening command had time to run, and nothing was left to close it again. The error, meanwhile, reported that the switch had been aborted.\n\n**After**\n\nSuch a drop now triggers closing the firewall back before the error reaches the client: previously nothing was attempted on this path, and a server left open while its mode said `BLACKHOLE` stayed that way until someone intervened.\n\nThat closing travels over the same connection that has just dropped, so it is an attempt, not a guarantee: if the server is unreachable altogether it does not arrive either, and the discrepancy remains. The response does not report this — the outcome of the attempt is visible in the platform log.\n\nOne case is deliberately left out: if the server had already been closed and it was the mode write that failed, the firewall is NOT reopened — undoing a completed closure because of a write failure would be the more dangerous choice. The server is then closed while its mode is reported as `OPEN`.\n\n**What integrators should do**\n\nResponse codes are unchanged, and retrying the request still makes sense. In the exception described above, retrying with `mode: \"OPEN\"` is rejected as `400 SAME_MODE` — the stored mode is already `OPEN`; access is restored by switching to `BLACKHOLE` and back to `OPEN`.\n",null,{},1794739478367]